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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 22, 2008, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc,
handed down the most important decision in design patent law in
nearly twenty-five years.1 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.
∗ J.D. Candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center (2010); B.S.E., Electrical Engineering, University of Michigan, magna cum laude (2006). This note was the
winning entry in the third annual Pierce Law Student Symposium writing competition. The author would like to thank Pierce Law Review members Elizabeth Lahey, Wallace Young, and Paul Smith for their feedback.
1. See Perry J. Saidman, Egyptian Goddess Exposed!, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 859, 885 (2008) [hereinafter Exposed!] (“Egyptian Goddess represents
a sea change in the law . . . .”); Rebecca L. Hanovice, ‘Egyptian Goddess’ Revises
Design Patent Analysis: Federal Circuit Disposed of the Long-Standing ‘Point of
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(Egyptian Goddess III)2 abolished the point-of-novelty test first set
out in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Talge3 and adopted by the Federal
Circuit in Litton Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.4 The point-ofnovelty test required patent holders to prove that an accused design
appropriated the element which sets the patented design apart from
the prior art—in addition to the ordinary-observer standard’s requirement of having substantially the same appearance—in order to
prove infringement.5
The point-of-novelty test proved difficult to apply and often rendered valid design patents unenforceable.6 Additionally, the test had
no basis in Supreme Court precedent.7 In place of the rigid point-ofnovelty test, the Federal Circuit announced a more malleable ordinary-observer standard that gives factfinders more leeway in evaluating infringement.8 Egyptian Goddess has been hailed as a major
victory for owners of design patents, but this Note argues that the
actual effect will be much more muted.
After giving an overview of design patents, this Note will analyze the cases that preceded the Federal Circuit’s adoption of the
point-of-novelty test in Litton Systems. Additionally, this Note will
discuss some of the cases decided during the reign of the point-ofnovelty test to demonstrate the problems inherent in it. After covering Egyptian Goddess in depth, the Note will then argue that Egyptian Goddess’s effect will be limited.
II. BACKGROUND
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respecNovelty’ Test, NAT’L L.J. (N.Y., N.Y.), Dec. 1, 2008, at S3 (“This is a wake-up
call . . . .”).
2. 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
3. 140 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1944).
4. 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
5. See id. at 1444.
6. See infra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.
7. See Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d at 672.
8. See id. at 678.
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tive Writings and Discoveries.”9 Congress first explicitly provided
patent protection for designs in 1842.10 Currently, design patents are
available for “any new, original and ornamental design for an article
of manufacture.”11 In general, design patents are governed by the
same statutory provisions as utility patents.12 Notably, design patents have terms of fourteen years from the date of granting,13 and, in
an infringement action, patentees have available an additional remedy vis-a-vis utility patents.14
Design patents cover only the ornamental features of a design.
Generally, these ornamental features consist of one or both of (1) “a
design for an ornament, impression, print, or picture applied to or
embodied in an article of manufacture” or (2) “a design for the shape
or configuration of an article of manufacture.”15 Unlike utility patents, design patents are generally not accompanied by verbal
claims.16 Rather, each design patent can only contain a single claim,
represented by drawings.17

9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, 5 Stat. 543 (“[A]ny citizen or citizens . . .
who by his, her, or their own industry, genius, efforts, and expense, may have
invented or produced any new and original design for a manufacture . . . may
make application in writing to the Commissioner of Patents . . . and the Commissioner . . . may grant a patent therefor . . . .”). Under this act, design patents were
given terms of seven years. Id. § 3, 5 Stat. at 544.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 173. In general, a utility patent’s term is twenty years from the date of
application. Id. § 154.
14. See id. § 289. Specifically, the owner of a design patent is entitled to an
infringer’s total profits, not less than $250. Id. This is in addition to damages
sufficient “to return the patent owner to the financial position he would have occupied but for the infringement” that is available to all patentees. Carborundum Co.
v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); see 35 U.S.C.
§ 289. Section 289 prohibits a patentee from “twice recover[ing] the profit made
from the infringement.” 35 U.S.C. § 289.
15. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1504.01 (8th ed., rev. 7 2008).
16. Id. § 1503.01.
17. Id.
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Design patents may overlap with other types of intellectual property. In In re Yardley,18 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
allowed for the design of a watch to be both copyrighted and protected by design patent, stating:
Congress, through its legislation under the authority of the
Constitution, has interpreted the Constitution as authorizing
an area of overlap where a certain type of creation may be the
subject matter of a copyright and the subject matter of a design patent. We see nothing in that legislation which is contradictory and repugnant to the intent of the framers of the
Constitution.19
Similarly, the same design may be protected under both trademark and design patent. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
held in In re Mogen David Wine Corp.20 that trademark rights “exist
independently of [design patent rights], under different law and for
different reasons.”21 Therefore, the applicant was allowed to receive
protection under both statutes.22
III. ORIGIN OF THE ORDINARY OBSERVER
The first U.S. Supreme Court case to attempt to set a standard for
design-patent infringement was Gorham Co. v. White.23 The plaintiff in Gorham held a patent on a design for the handles of tablespoons and forks.24 The patented design was very popular, and the
value of the patent was “immense.”25 White, the defendant, obtained
18. 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
19. Id. at 1395–96.
20. 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
21. Id. at 930.
22. Id. at 932. This dual-coverage was a basis in the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent requirement of secondary meaning for trademark protection of product configurations. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000)
(“[T]he producer can ordinarily obtain protection for a design that is inherently
source identifying (if any such exists), but that does not yet have secondary meaning, by securing a design patent or a copyright for the design . . . .”).
23. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1872).
24. Id. at 512; see U.S. Patent No. D1,440 (filed July 16, 1861).
25. Gorham, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 512 & n.3.
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two patents for similar designs.26 Gorham sued in equity to enjoin
White from the manufacture or sale of spoons or forks covered by
White’s patents.27 White defended on the grounds that his designs
did not infringe Gorham’s.28 The two designs, although similar,
were not identical.29 Experts for both sides testified as to the similarity vel non of the two designs.30

Figure 1. Gorham and White Designs31

The Court held that a design patent protects “that which gives a
peculiar or distinctive appearance to the manufacture, or article to
which it may be applied, or to which it gives form.”32 In determin26. Id. at 512; see U.S. Patent No. D2,992 (filed Mar. 31, 1868); U.S. Patent No.
D2,551 (filed Jan. 15, 1867).
27. Gorham, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 512.
28. Id. at 512–13.
29. See id. at 520.
30. Id. at 513–18.
31. Id. at 521.
32. Id. at 525.
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ing whether a design patent is infringed, “the controlling consideration is the resultant effect” of the design.33 Therefore, the test for
infringement turns on the “sameness of appearance,” and slight variations in the designs will not avoid infringement.34 Turning to
White’s contention that, for infringement to be found, an accused
design must be indistinguishable from the patented design to an expert, the Court recognized that such a test would be extremely narrow.35 The Court added:
It is [observers of ordinary acuteness] who are the principal
purchasers of the articles to which designs have given novel
appearances, and if they are misled, and induced to purchase
what is not the article they supposed it to be . . . the patentees
are injured, and that advantage of a market which the patent
was granted to secure is destroyed.36
Following this reasoning, the Court established the test for infringement of a design patent:
[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention
as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the
same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the
other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.37
In Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co.,38 the Supreme Court further
elaborated on the test for infringement. The Whitman Saddle Company held a design patent for a saddle that was a combination of two
older saddles: the cantle, or back, was the same as that of a Jenifer
saddle, while the pommel, or front, was the same as that of Granger
saddle, except that the pommel of the patented design fell off perpendicularly on its rear side.39 Whitman Saddle Company sued
Smith and Bourn for infringement of the patent.40 The Smith saddle
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Gorham, 81 U.S. (14 (Wall.) at 526.
Id. at 526–27.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 528.
Id.
148 U.S. 674 (1893).
Id. at 676; see U.S. Patent No. D10,844 (filed Sept. 2, 1878).
Whitman Saddle, 148 U.S. at 675.
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incorporated the Jenifer cantle and Granger pommel, but did not
have the same perpendicular drop at the rear of the pommel as the
patented design.41 The Court initially held that Whitman’s combination of the Jenifer and Granger saddles was not patentable.42 However, the Court went on to address the issue of infringement, stating:
The shape of the front end being old, the sharp drop of the
pommel at the rear seems to constitute what was new and to
be material. . . . If, therefore, this drop were material to the
design, and rendered it patentable as a complete and integral
Whole, there was no infringement.43
Although the Court’s infringement analysis would come to be interpreted by lower courts as setting out a requirement that an accused
design appropriate the patented design’s point of novelty over the
prior art, the Court set out no such requirement.
IV. THE PATH TO POINT OF NOVELTY
Early cases followed Whitman Saddle by comparing the patented
design and the accused design taking into consideration the prior art,
but did not impose the rigid point-of-novelty requirement that would
come to characterize later cases. Bevin Bros. Manufacturing Co. v.
Starr Bros. Bell Co.44 was the first in the line of cases leading up to
the point-of-novelty requirement. The design patent covered a bell
with a body portion in the shape of an “oblate spheroid.”45 In determining whether the accused design infringed, the court stated that it
“may avail itself of such common knowledge as is possessed by the

41. Id. at 682.
42. Id. at 681.
43. Id. at 682. The Whitman Saddle decision was issued before there was a
statutory nonobviousness requirement. Had the statutory nonobviousness requirement been in place, the Court’s analysis may have been different. See Perry
J. Saidman, What Is the Point of the Point of Novelty Test for Design Patent Infringement?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 401, 419 (2008) [hereinafter
What Is the Point].
44. 114 F. 362 (C.C.D. Conn. 1902).
45. Id. at 362.
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general public.”46 It then determined that “[t]he shape of defendants’ bell differs from plaintiff’s more widely than plaintiff’s differs from the [prior art] door knob, and therefore defendants’ construction does not infringe the patent.”47
Figure 2. Bevin Design48

Similarly, in Zidell v. Dexter,49 the Ninth Circuit looked to the
prior art when the patented design was a combination of prior art
designs. The patented design covered children’s clothing and was a
combination of elements known in the prior art.50 The accused designs brought together the same prior art elements in a different
combination.51 The court found no infringement, stating that “[t]he
differences in designs, which under the patent law will avoid infringement, are differences which will attract the attention of the
ordinary observer, giving such attention as the purchaser usually
46. Id. at 363.
47. Id.
48. U.S. Patent No. 33,142 fig.1 (filed July 27, 1900) (arrows removed).
49. 262 F. 145 (9th Cir. 1920).
50. Id. at 146.
51. Id. at 147. The lower court found that one of the accused designs did infringe. Id. The defendant did not appeal this ruling. Id.
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gives in buying articles of the kind in question and for the purposes
for which they are intended.”52

Figure 3. Zidell Design53

52. Id. In holding that the lower court was not in error by finding the patent
valid, the court may have broken from the Supreme Court’s holding in Whitman
Saddle. See id. at 146.
53. U.S. Patent No. D52,720 fig.2 (filed Aug. 12, 1918).
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Figure 4. Applied Arts Design54

Later decisions began imposing a requirement that an accused
design appropriate the patented design’s point of novelty to support a
finding of infringement, but fell short of an explicit point-of-novelty
test. Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp.55 is representative of such cases. The patented and accused designs were
combination lighter/ashtrays for an automobile dashboard.56 The
Sixth Circuit recognized precedent stating that “a design patent is not
infringed by anything which does not present the appearance which
distinguishes the design claimed in the patent from the prior art.”57
Such an explicit requirement of an accused design’s appropriation of
the distinguishing characteristics of the patented design is more restrictive than Gorham’s admonition that infringement is present
when an ordinary observer would be deceived.58 In attempting to
reconcile the more restrictive rule with Gorham, the court held that
“[t]he ordinary observer is not any observer, but one who, with less
than the trained faculties of the expert, is a purchaser of things of
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

U.S. Patent No. D84,811 figs.1 & 2 (filed Dec. 20, 1930).
67 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1933).
Id. at 428.
Id. at 429.
Id.
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similar design, or one interested in the subject.”59 Thus, “similitude
of appearance is to be judged by the scope of the patent in relation to
the prior art.”60 Because the difference between the accused design
and patented design was greater than the difference between the patented design and the prior art, the court found no infringement.61
The first case to set out an explicit point-of-novelty test in addition to the ordinary-observer test was Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Talge. Foster L. Talge sued Sears, arguing that Sears had infringed
his design patents on fruit juicers.62 The Eighth Circuit set out the
test for design patent infringement:
The test of whether one design infringes another depends
primarily upon whether the appearance of the two designs is
substantially the same. The application of this test involves
two considerations: first, to infringe, the identity of appearance, or sameness of effect as a whole upon the eye of an ordinary purchaser must be such as to deceive him, inducing
him to purchase one, supposing it to be the other; and, second, to infringe, the accused device must appropriate the
novelty in the patented device which distinguishes it from the
prior art.63
For support of a separate point-of-novelty test, the Eighth Circuit
cited cases, including Applied Arts and Whitman Saddle, which mentioned a comparison of the patented design with the prior art but did
not articulate a two-part test.64 Despite the articulation of a second
test for infringement, the Eighth Circuit applied the ordinaryobserver test in the same way as Applied Arts and Whitman Saddle
and found that there was no confusion under the ordinary-observer
test.65

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 430 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 429.
Applied Arts, 67 F.2d at 430.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Talge, 140 F.2d 395, 395 (8th Cir. 1944).
Id. at 395–96 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 396.
Id.
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Figure 5. Talge Designs66

V. LITTON SYSTEMS AND ITS AFTERMATH
The Federal Circuit first articulated a separate point-of-novelty
test in Litton Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp. Litton Systems sued
Whirlpool for infringement of design patent covering the design of
microwave ovens and microwave oven doors.67 Citing Sears, Roebuck, the Federal Circuit announced a point-of-novelty test separate
from the ordinary-observer test.68 In determining the point of novelty of the design, the court looked to the point of novelty as deter-

66. U.S. Patent No. D105,335 fig.1 (filed June 5, 1937); U.S. Patent No.
D105,071 fig.1 (filed Apr. 30, 1937).
67. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Litton also alleged infringement of a utility patent and violation unfair competition
law. Id. The Federal Circuit held that the utility patent was invalid because the
USPTO calculated the filing date as more than one year from the date of sale. Id.
at 1436, 1440. The Federal Circuit ruled in favor of Whirlpool on the unfair competition claims. Id. at 1449.
68. Id. at 1444.

File: Szarenski Final v.3.doc

2009

Created on: 1/24/10 7:12 PM

Last Printed: 1/24/10 7:12 PM

A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THE LAW OF DESIGN PATENTS?

101

mined by the nonobviousness analysis.69 The Whirlpool design featured none of these points of novelty; the court therefore held that
there was no infringement.70 Because there was no infringement
under the point-of-novelty test, the Federal Circuit did not reach a
determination on the ordinary-observer test.
Although the point-of-novelty test worked well when the patented design involved a single improvement over a single prior art
reference, it was difficult to apply when the patented design involved
multiple improvements over several different prior art references.71
In Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner International, LLC,72 for instance, the Federal Circuit held that the point of novelty of a design
could not consist of a combination of elements:
If the combination of old elements shown in the prior art is
itself sufficient to constitute a “point of novelty” of a new design, it would be the rare design that would not have a point
of novelty. The practical effect of Lawman’s theory would
be virtually to eliminate the significance of the “points of novelty” test in determining infringement of design patents, and
to provide patent protection for designs that in fact involve
no significant changes from the prior art.73

69. Id. The use of points of novelty as determined by the nonobviousness analysis allows for what is essentially an invalidity determination, only with a lower
burden placed on the infringer. This backdoor invalidity attack is one of the main
criticisms of the point-of-novelty analysis. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American
Intellectual Property Law Ass’n in Support of Neither Party at 9–10, Egyptian
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess III), 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(No. 2006-1562); Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Apple Inc. in Support of Neither Party (Supporting Reversal) at 18, Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d 665 (No.
2006-1562). The problem is illustrated by Litton Systems itself, as the patent was
held to be nonobvious. 728 F.2d at 1443.
70. Litton Sys., 728 F.2d at 1444.
71. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Ass’n
in Support of Neither Party, supra note 69, at 8–9; Corrected Brief of Amicus
Curiae Apple Inc. in Support of Neither Party (Supporting Reversal), supra note
69, at 25–26.
72. 437 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
73. Id. at 1386 (citing Winner Int’l Corp. v. Wolo Mfg. Corp. 905 F.2d 375, 376
(Fed. Cir. 1990)). Two years earlier, the Federal Circuit had upheld a district
court’s ruling that the point of novelty of a design patent was a combination of
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Additionally, the Federal Circuit often inconsistently applied the
point-of-novelty test. In Arminak & Associates, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain
Calmar, Inc.,74 Arminak filed an action for a declaratory judgment
of noninfringement of Calmar’s patent on a “trigger sprayer
shroud.”75 The Federal Circuit found one of the points of novelty to
be a prominent horizontal line.76 The court found the accused design
contained this point of novelty, but it “result[ed] in a different overall design appearance.”77 Therefore, the court reasoned, the point of
novelty was not appropriated.78 This incorporation of the ordinaryobserver test into the point-of-novelty test elevated the burden of
proof in an infringement action even higher.
VI. EGYPTIAN GODDESS V. SWISA
A. District Court
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. (EGI) sued Swisa, Inc. and Dror Swisa,
an individual, for infringement of a design patent on a nail buffer.79
The patented design consisted of a hollow rectangular tube with exposed edges and buffers on three sides, the fourth side being bare.80
The accused design was similar in appearance, except that it had four
buffers, one on each side.81 At the trial court level, EGI argued that
its design contained four elements—an open and hollow body,
three elements. See Avia Group Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557,
1565 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The court’s break with precedent in Lawman was highly
criticized. See generally Aaron Cook, Note, Points of Novelty, Lawman Armor,
and the Destruction of Design Patents!, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 103 (2007); Daniel Adam Nadel, Note, The Elusive Point of Novelty Test Leaves Design Patent
Infringement in Limbo: A Critique of Lawman Armor Corporation v. Winner International, LLC, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 343 (2008).
74. 501 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2906 (2008).
75. Id. at 1318.
76. Id. at 1325.
77. Id. at 1326.
78. Id. The court cited no authority for this proposition.
79. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess I), No. 3:03-CV0594-N, 2005 WL 5873510, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2005).
80. Id.
81. Id. at *2.
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square cross-section, raised rectangular pads, and exposed corners—
and that the point of novelty of the design was the combination of
those four elements.82 At summary judgment, the district court
found that the Nailco patent83 contained all of the elements except a
fourth side without a pad; the court also found that the fourth side
without a pad was the point of novelty of EGI’s design.84 The Swisa
design did not contain this element, so the point of novelty was not
appropriated.85 The district court therefore granted Swisa’s motion
for summary judgment on the issue of infringement.86
Figure 6. EGI Design87

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at *2 & n.4.
U.S. Patent No. D416,648 (filed Aug. 17, 1998).
Egyptian Goddess I, 2005 WL 5873510, at *2.
Id.
Id.
U.S. Patent No. D467,389 fig.1 (filed Feb. 13, 2002).
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Figure 7. Nailco Patent88

B. Panel Hearing
EGI appealed the district court’s finding of noninfringement to
the Federal Circuit.89 The majority established a new rule requiring
a combination to be “a non-trivial advance over the prior art” in order to constitute a point of novelty.90 The new non-trivial advance
test moved the point-of-novelty test even closer to the nonobviousness test. The majority shrugged off this consequence stating,
“[d]esign patent law has already intertwined the infringement and
validity tests.”91 The majority then concluded that “no reasonable
juror could conclude that EGI’s asserted point of novelty constituted
a non-trivial advance over the prior art,” and upheld the lower
court’s granting of summary judgment to the defendant.92
88. ’648 Patent.
89. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess II), 498 F.3d 1354,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
90. Id. at 1357. In doing so, the majority distinguished Lawman, stating that it
did not reject non-trivial advance test. Id. at 1357 n.2.
91. Id. at 1358 n.3.
92. Id. at 1358–59.
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Judge Dyk dissented, stating that he would not have created the
new non-trivial advance standard because it departed from precedent
and was not addressed by either party.93 Judge Dyk went on to point
out the flaws of the non-trivial advance test. First, it “eviscerate[d]
the statutory presumption of validity” because it placed the burden
on the patentee to prove nonobviousness in order to show infringement.94 Second, the test was too narrow because it applied only to
design patents involving a combination of designs.95 Third, the test
was too broad because it extended an obviousness test to each individual point of novelty, not just the overall design.96 Fourth, “it
[was] almost impossible to determine whether a particular design
feature represent[ed] a trivial or substantial advance over the prior
art.”97 Fifth, the new test was not supported by case law and was
actually contrary to several Federal Circuit holdings.98 Judge Dyk
also pointed out that the non-trivial advance test was actually more
restrictive than the nonobviousness test for validity because the nontrivial advance test did not take into account secondary considerations.99 The Federal Circuit granted EGI’s petition for en banc rehearing, ordering the parties to address whether the point-of-novelty
test should “be a test for infringement of design patent [sic].”100
C. En Banc
At the en banc hearing, EGI argued that the ordinary-observer
test alone could adequately address the concerns meant to be addressed by the point-of-novelty and non-trivial advance tests.101
93. Id. at 1359 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Egyptian Goddess II, 498 F.3d at 1359 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1359–60.
99. Id. at 1359 n.1.
100. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 256 F. App’x 357, 357 (Fed. Cir.
2007). The court also directed questions on specifics of the point-of-novelty test
and what role claim construction should play in interpretation of design patents.
Id. at 357–58.
101. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess III), 543 F.3d 665,
672 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Swisa, on the other hand, argued that the Supreme Court had
adopted the point-of-novelty test in Whitman Saddle and the Federal
Circuit could not depart from it.102
The Federal Circuit, in a unanimous opinion, first recognized
that the point-of-novelty test was difficult to apply in cases that did
not involve a single advance over a single prior art reference.103 The
court then held that the point-of-novelty test was inconsistent with
Gorham and not mandated by Whitman Saddle or other precedent
prior to Litton Systems.104 The court stated that the point of novelty
test was not mandated by Whitman Saddle because: (1) nothing in
Whitman Saddle suggested a point of novelty test;105 and (2) cases
immediately subsequent to Whitman Saddle interpreted it as requiring a comparison between the patented design and the prior art,
without the requirement of a specific point of novelty.106
The court also held that the ordinary-observer test, as set out in
Whitman Saddle, was sufficient to guard against expansive assertions of design patent rights.107 A comparison between the patented
design, the accused design, and the prior art was sufficient to determine if an ordinary observer would be deceived.108 Furthermore, the
ordinary-observer test avoided the problems inherent in the point-ofnovelty test.109
Specifically, according to the court, the point-of-novelty test incorrectly focused only on specific aspects of a design, rather than the
design as a whole.110 Furthermore, the more novel the design, the
more difficult it was to determine a point of novelty.111 Additionally, the case law was never clear as to what extent combinations of
102. Id.
103. Id. at 671.
104. Id. at 672.
105. Id. at 673.
106. Id. at 674–75.
107. Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d at 676.
108. Id. at 676–77.
109. Id. at 677; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property
Law Ass’n in Support of Neither Party, supra note 69; Corrected Brief of Amicus
Curiae Apple Inc. in Support of Neither Party (Supporting Reversal), supra note
69.
110. Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d at 677.
111. Id.
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prior art elements constituted a point of novelty.112 Notably, the
Federal Circuit did not mention that the point-of-novelty test had
become a backdoor invalidity attack. For these reasons, the Federal
Circuit rejected the point-of-novelty test along with the non-trivial
advance test.113
In place of the point-of-novelty test, the Federal Circuit announced that the ordinary-observer test would remain in place with a
slight modification: the factfinder would also consider the prior
art.114 Under this modified ordinary-observer test, a court first examines the patented and accused designs.115 If the two designs “are
not plainly dissimilar,” the factfinder should compare the two designs in light of the prior art.116 According to the court, this modification of the ordinary-observer test more closely followed the analysis of Whitman Saddle and subsequent circuit court decisions.117
The court placed the burden on the patentee to prove infringement,
but the burden was placed on the accused infringer to produce prior
art references that show an ordinary observer would not be confused.118 Despite the Federal Circuit’s elimination of the point-ofnovelty test, the court still ruled against EGI.119 The court held that
ordinary purchasers of nail buffers distinguished between those buffers with three pads and those with four pads; accordingly, an ordi-

112. Id.; see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
113. Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d at 678.
114. Id. This test has been dubbed the “3-way Visual Comparison” test. See
What Is the Point, supra note 43, at 412–13. Both the AIPLA and Apple amicus
briefs argued eloquently for taking into account the prior art while applying the
ordinary-observer test. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property
Law Association in support of Neither Party, supra note 69; Corrected Brief of
Amicus Curiae Apple Inc. in Support of Neither Party, supra note 69.
115. Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d at 678.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 678–79. Additionally, the Federal Circuit held that district courts need
not verbally construe design patents as a prerequisite to infringement analysis. Id.
at 679. This holding may make proving infringement easier. See Perry J. Saidman
& Allison Singh, The Death of Gorham Co. v. White: Killing It Softly with Markman, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 792 (2004).
119. Egyptian Goddess III, 543 F.3d at 682.

File: Szarenski Final v.3.doc

108

Created on: 1/24/10 7:12 PM

PIERCE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 1/24/10 7:12 PM

Vol. 8, No. 1

nary observer would not believe the accused design to be the same as
the patented design.120
VII. THE EFFECT OF THE ABOLITION OF THE POINT-OF-NOVELTY TEST
The Federal Circuit’s rejection of the point-of-novelty test has
been hailed as a victory for design patent holders,121 but how great of
an impact will it have on design infringement analysis? It would be
incorrect to assume that, under Egyptian Goddess, all previous cases
that found infringement under the ordinary-observer test, but not the
point-of-novelty test, would come out in favor of the patent holder.
Courts, in their application of the ordinary-observer test, often did
not take any account of the prior art. Although there will undoubtedly be benefits for those designs that do not have an easily articulated point of novelty, there will also be designs in a crowded field
of prior art that are not infringed under either the point-of-novelty
and the post-Egyptian Goddess ordinary-observer standard. Only
when more cases using the new ordinary-observer test are handed
down will one definitively be able to determine the effect that Egyptian Goddess will have on design patent law. However, by reexamining those cases that have already been decided under the old standard, one may be able to formulate an educated guess. In this spirit,
this section will first analyze the first cases to apply the new ordinary-observer test. Then, with those analyses in mind, this Note will
examine Torspo Hockey International, Inc. v. Kor Hockey Ltd.122

120. Id. The Federal Circuit denied EGI’s petition for rehearing without opinion.
EGI petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, arguing that “the
Federal Circuit erred by failing to hold that when the patented and accused designs
are compared in light of the prior art designs, the comparison is to be conducted by
viewing the visual effect of each design as a whole.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess IV), 129 S. Ct.
1917 (2009) (No. 08-1031). The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Egyptian Goddess IV, 129 S. Ct. at 1917.
121. See Exposed!, supra note 1, at 860 (“The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . has provided some long-needed relief for design patent owners.”);
Hanovice, supra note 1, at S3 (“Design patent holders have reason to celebrate . . .
.”).
122. 491 F. Supp. 2d 871 (D. Minn. 2007).
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and Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc. (Fisher-Price II),123 two preEgyptian Goddess infringement cases where the patentee satisfied
the ordinary-observer test, but not the point-of-novelty test.
A. Post-Egyptian Goddess
The first design patent infringement case decided after Egyptian
Goddess, Arc’teryx Equipment, Inc. v. Westcomb Outerwear, Inc.,124
may be indicative of how infringement analyses will be conducted in
the future. Arc’teryx brought suit against Westcomb for infringement of the D513,715 Patent125 for a jacket zipper.126 On Westcomb’s summary judgment motion, the court found no infringement.127 The court first determined that the ordinary observer consisted of “an outdoor clothing customer who is more discerning that
[sic] an average retail shopper.”128 Taking notice of the Federal Circuit’s deviation from requiring a verbal description, the district court
instead focused on the impression that the two zippers would leave
on the ordinary observer.129 The court stated: “An ordinary observer
of the ’715 patent would be left with the impression that the zipper
contains two sections . . . . An ordinary observer of Defendant’s
product would be left with the impression that Defendant’s zipper
consists of three sections . . . .”130 The placement of the diagonal
sections, the length of the diagonal sections, and the lengths of the
straight sections were also taken into account.131 Examining the
prior art, the court found that the patented design was closer to the
Lowe Alpine’s Black Ice Jacket, which was prior art, than it was to
the accused design.132 Therefore, there was no infringement.133

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

109 F. App’x 387 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
No. 2:07-CV-59 TS, 2008 WL 4838141 (D. Utah Nov. 4, 2008).
U.S. Patent No. D513,715 (filed Aug. 10, 2004).
Arc’teryx Equip., 2008 WL 4838141, at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Arc’teryx Equip., 2008 WL 4838141, at *3.
Id.
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Figure 8. Arc'teryx Design134

International Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp.,135 also
applied the new ordinary-observer test. International Seaway sued
Walgreens and a supplier for infringement of three patents for the
design of a clog.136 Walgreens moved for summary judgment, arguing that International Seaway’s patents were anticipated by two
models of shoes made by Crocs, Inc.137 Applying the ordinaryobserver test, the court found that “[t]he actual shape of the overall
shoe and the sole is nearly identical between the two shoes.”138 The
slight variations in the number and location of holes on the sole of
the shoe were not enough for an ordinary observer to get a different
134. U.S. Patent No. D513,715 fig.1 (filed Aug. 10, 2004).
135. 599 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
136. Id. at 1310. The patents owned by Seaway were: U.S. Patent No. D545,033
(filed Feb. 16, 2006); U.S. Patent No. D545,032 (filed Feb. 1, 2006); U.S. Patent
No. D529,263 (filed Feb. 18, 2005).
137. Int’l Seaway Trading, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1312. Although this case deals
with anticipation, the analysis is the same as infringement analysis under the maxim “that which infringes if later, anticipates if earlier.” See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
138. Int’l Seaway Trading, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.
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impression.139 Because International Seaway’s patents were not
novel, the court held that they were invalid.140
Figure 9. International Seaway Design141

139. Id. at 1318–19.
140. Id. at 1319. If the court examined any prior art of the Crocs design, it was
not mentioned in the opinion. However, the Crocs patents were sufficiently distinct from the prior art that the outcome would most likely have been the same.
See U.S. Patent No. D517,789 (filed May 28, 2004). A third case has applied the
post-Egyptian Goddess ordinary-observer standard. See Minka Lighting, Inc. v.
Maxim Lighting Int’l, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-995-K, 2009 WL 691594 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 16, 2009). This case is not very instructive, however, as the court determined
that the accused designs were sufficiently dissimilar to the patented designs that no
comparison to the prior art was necessary. See id. at *8.
141. ’263 Patent fig.1.
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Figure 11. Prior Art143

142. ’789 Patent fig.1.
143. U.S. Patent No. D479,906 (filed Apr. 4, 2003).
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B. Pre-Egyptian Goddess
Torspo Hockey International, Inc. v. Kor Hockey Ltd., is illustrative of the odd results that sometimes occurred when the point-ofnovelty test was used as a backdoor validity test. Torspo sought a
declaratory judgment that Kor’s D514,505 Patent144 was invalid and
not infringed.145 In response, Kor sought a preliminary injunction
against Torspo forbidding the selling, making, using, or distributing
of certain models of Torspo skates.146 To obtain the injunction, Kor
was required to show, inter alia, that it was reasonably likely to
prove that Torspo was infringing.147 Applying the ordinary-observer
test, the court found that an ordinary observer would consider the
accused design and patented design to be substantially the same.148
However, the court found that the shape of the skate was “in fact, not
novel.”149 The court reached this conclusion because Kor carried the
burden of proving the points of novelty.150 Because Kor was unlikely to show a point of novelty, the court denied its motion for a
preliminary injunction.151
Although Kor was unable to show a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits for infringement, the court analyzed whether
Torspo raised a substantial question as to the patent’s validity.152
The court found that ’505 Patent was sufficiently distinct from the
prior art that there was not a substantial question as to invalidity for
obviousness or anticipation.153
Although not a final judgment, Torspo is demonstrative of one of
the major flaws of the point-of-novelty test: its use as a backdoor
invalidity attack. Torspo was unable to prove anticipation because
of the heightened proof requirements. Kor, however, was left with a
144. U.S. Patent No. D514,505 (filed Sept. 20, 2004).
145. Torspo Hockey Int’l, Inc. v. Kor Hockey Ltd., 491 F. Supp. 2d 871, 873 (D.
Minn. 2007).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 877.
149. Id. at 877–78.
150. Id. at 878.
151. Torspo, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 879.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 881.
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valid patent that was completely unenforceable. This result was a
direct result of two factors. First, the burden was on Torspo to prove
anticipation,154 while Kor had the burden to establish points of novelty.155 Second, the court could consider a combination of elements
when examining novelty, but the point-of-novelty test required the
elements to be examined individually.156
Under the new ordinary-observer test, however, the court’s determination of infringement likely would have been different. The
prior art cited by Torspo pertained to inline skates as well as ice
skates.157 These designs contained the arch disclosed in the ’505
Patent, but none of the designs disclosed “the high heel profile, the
sloped downward transition from the high profile at the heel toward
the mid-foot portion, [and] the relatively shallow profile from the
mid-foot forward to the toe.”158 The ’505 design therefore “departs
conspicuously from the prior art.”159 The accused design, on the
other hand, is identical to the patented design. Comparing the two
designs, an ordinary observer familiar with skates would not be able
to distinguish the two. Under the new ordinary-observer test, the
Torspo skate would be infringing.
In Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc., the plaintiff, Fisher-Price,
brought an infringement suit against various competitors for in154. Id. at 880–81.
155. Id. at 879.
156. Id. at 880 n.6 (citing L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d
1117, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). The district court mentioned how this incongruity
between the novelty and point-of-novelty tests could lead to the bizarre result of a
design patent being novel, but lacking a point of novelty. Id. The same type of
incongruity may still be present in the modified ordinary-observer test set out in
Egyptian Goddess. See Exposed!, supra note 1, at 883–84. Mr. Saidman, who
also authored Apple’s amicus brief for the Egyptian Goddess en banc rehearing,
argues that a hypothetical Swisa design patent application for its nail buffer would
be denied as obvious. Id. at 884. Since the test for obviousness is under the designer skilled in the art standard, and a designer skilled in the art would have a
more discerning eye than an ordinary observer, the Federal Circuit’s holding that
the Swisa buffer did not infringe appears to be untenable. Id.
157. See U.S. Patent No. 6,267,411 (filed Oct. 6, 1998); U.S. Patent No.
6,186,519 (filed Sept. 11, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,855,380 (filed Dec. 9, 1996).
158. Torspo, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 880 (alteration in original).
159. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess III), 543 F.3d 665,
677 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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fringement of several patents pertaining to carriers, strollers, and
bassinets for infants.160
Of the five patents at issue, one,
D431,940,161 was a design patent for the cover of a bassinet. The
only prior art considered by the trial court was a prototype designed
by Scott Ziegler.162 A jury found the patent valid and infringed, and
the district court denied the defendant’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law.163 On appeal, the Federal Circuit overturned the verdict, stating that Fisher-Price failed to establish a point of novelty
over the prior art.164
Even under the new ordinary-observer test, this decision would
likely go against Fisher-Price. The accused design is actually more
similar to the Zeigler prior art than it is to the ’940 patent.165 In order to prove infringement, Fisher-Price would have to undermine the
validity of its ’940 patent by arguing against the novelty of the ’940
patent over the Zeigler prior art. As in Applied Arts, the “similitude
of appearance” between the patented and accused design is not
enough to create “sameness of effect upon the eye” when viewed in
relation to the prior art.166

160. Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc. (Fisher-Price I), 279 F. Supp. 2d 530,
536 (D. Del. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, modified in part, 109 F. App’x 387
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
161. U.S. Patent No. D431,940 (filed May 14, 1999).
162. Fisher-Price I, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
163. Id. at 542–47.
164. Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc. (Fisher-Price II), 109 F. App’x 387, 394
(Fed. Cir. 2004). The Federal Circuit stated that Fisher-Price could not point to
any testimony identifying a point of novelty. Id. On the defendants’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law following the jury verdict, the district court stated
“Fisher-Price adduced expert testimony suggesting that the points of novelty of the
’940 patent consisted of the dome and its ornamental features.” Fisher-Price I,
279 F. Supp. 2d at 545. The Federal Circuit did not elaborate on this contradiction. An examination of the record reveals that the district court erroneously cited
to a witness’s testimony that did not attempt to compare the patented design with
the prior art. See Brief for Appellants Safety 1st, Inc., et al. at 48, Fisher-Price II,
109 F. App’x 387 (No. 03-1644).
165. See Brief for Appellants Safety 1st, Inc., et al., supra note 164, at 47.
166. Applied Arts Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp., 67 F.2d 428, 429–30
(6th Cir. 1933).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Egyptian Goddess undoubtedly was a victory for design patent
owners. The point-of-novelty test, which had no basis in Supreme
Court precedent, imposed a high standard on holders of design patents in order to prove infringement. Additionally, the point-ofnovelty test had the effect of forcing plaintiffs to prove that their
design patents were enforceable. But the Federal Circuit’s ruling
will not affect all design patents equally. In particular, those patents
that are sufficiently distinct from the prior art that the determination
of a point of novelty is difficult, if not impossible, will receive significantly more protection after Egyptian Goddess. Additionally,
those designs that are exactly copied by an infringer will no longer
be rendered unenforceable merely because a court determines that
the design has no point of novelty.

